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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Financial Reporting

出版	SSRN, 1999
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=0FDozgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋According to the neutrality assumption, accounting information is to reflect accounting principles and their implementation in accordance with objective professional standards, free from bias towards a predetermined result. This work presents a range of evidence which is inconsistent with the neutrality assumption, casting doubt on its validity in describing the accounting reality. In view of this evidence, we present an alternative approach to financial reporting, based on game theory. We relate to financial accounting as a game in which various players participate: the reporting entities, the users of the reports, the standard-setting authorities, auditors and other supervisory bodies. Unlike neutrality, it is assumed that the interest of the various players is to maximize their payoff. In line with this view, standard-setting, financial reports, the auditors? approach and the analysis of the reports made by the users are parameters determined in the game equilibrium. Since the equilibrium depends on the characteristics of the specific players in the game, these parameters change together with the preferences of the various players. From the game-theoretic perspective, it is worthwhile for each players to analyze the preferences and motives of the other players, as the basis for making his (her) decisions. According to this approach, the economic information to be obtained from the financial statements depends on the game context in which they are produced.