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Patent Privateering, Litigation, and R&D Incentives

Jorge LemusEmil Temnyalov

出版	SSRN, 2018
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=0c3izwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We model “patent privateering”--whereby producing firms sell patents to patent assertion entities (PAEs) which then license them under the threat of litigation--in a bargaining game. PAEs can negotiate higher licensing fees than producing firms, because they cannot be counter-sued for infringement. Privateering produces two countervailing effects: it increases the offensive value of patents, whereas it decreases their defensive value and lowers the aggregate surplus of producing firms. Embedding the bargaining game into an R&D contest for multiple complementary technologies, we find that privateering may increase R&D investments, even as it induces more litigation threats and reduces industry profits.