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Elite Kinship Network and State Strengthening

其他書名	Theory and Evidence from Imperial China
出版	SSRN, 2020
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=0yzxzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Existing theories of state strengthening focus on macro-level factors. We know less about the micro-level incentives for elites to support or oppose state strengthening. I develop an argument in which elites choose between the state and private order institutions (e.g., clans, tribes, or ethnic groups) to economize services for their families. When elites' kinship networks are geographically dispersed, they prefer to strengthen the state because it is more efficient to “buy” services from the state. When elites' kinship networks are geographically concentrated, they prefer a weak state because they can “make” low-cost private services and evade taxes to the state. I map politicians' kinship networks using their tomb epitaphs from eleventh-century China and show that, even facing severe external threats, politicians exhibited polarization in their attitudes toward state strengthening, which can be explained by the geography of their kinship networks. The findings point to the importance of social structure in understanding state building.