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註釋This paper examines the institutional challenges facing the Indian Parliament. It argues that over the years there has been a decline in the effectiveness of Parliament as an institution of accountability and oversight. It shows that the instruments that Parliament can use for accountability--motions on the floor, oversight powers, the committee system--are increasingly being rendered dysfunctional. Parliament is becoming a less effective voice on fiscal management, on the economy, on social policy and on the terms on which India is integrating into the global economy, because of self-abdication and not because of uncontrollable exogenous factors. According to the authors, in so far as structural changes in Indian politics have led to an adverse self-selection in who enters politics, and thereby the calibre of persons likely to enter Parliament, one cannot be too optimistic about the capacity of Parliament to rejuvenate itself. More important than the changes in the professional background of MPs is that those charged with making laws may be law breakers themselves. This does not augur well for the credibility of the Indian Parliament.