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Organizational Structure and Investment Strategy
Gyöngyi Lóránth
Alan Morrison
Jing Zeng
出版
Centre for Economic Policy Research
, 2020
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=22X-zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
We show that a firm can use its organizational structure to commit to an investment strategy. The firm delegates sequential search and project management tasks to a manager. Ex post, the firm turns away projects that generate high project management rent. However, because the expectation of such rent serves to defray the manager's search cost, investment might be optimal ex ante. A leveraged subsidiary mitigates this time-inconsistency problem by creating ex post risk-shifting incentives that counteract underinvestment. Subsidiaries are more valuable for projects with costly search, intermediate management costs, and returns that are uncorrelated with the existing business.