登入選單
返回Google圖書搜尋
Public Disclosure and Bank Failures
Mr.Tito CordellaMr.Eduardo Levy Yeyati
出版International Monetary Fund, 1997-08-01
主題Business & Economics / Banks & BankingBusiness & Economics / Industries / Financial ServicesBusiness & Economics / Money & Monetary Policy
ISBN14518518719781451851878
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=2lcYEAAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋This paper examines how public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure affects banks’ risk-taking incentives and assesses how the presence of informed depositors influences the soundness of the banking system. It finds that, when banks have complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolios, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crises. However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures.