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Third- and Lower-Price Auctions

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

出版	SSRN, 2012
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=2q_czwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third-- and lower--price auctions. In these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids if one moves to a lower price auction, and lower bids if the number of bidders is increased. Third-- and lower--price auctions are unappealing under risk aversion, which in turn may make them appealing when the auction is a substitute for small scale gambling, as in many Internet auctions. Moreover, in the presence of a corrupt agent-auctioneer, an auction may turn out to be third-- or lower--price, even though it was set up as a second--price or hybrid English auction.