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Substitution Policy and Generic Competition

Laura Birg

出版	Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, cege, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2019
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=3D-yzQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

I model the market for an active ingredient (with a brand-name drug and n differentiated generic versions) to study the effect of a substitution rule on prices and the extensive and intensive margin of generic competition. Both substitution rules with physician and patient veto decrease the brand-name price and shift market shares from the brand-name drug to the generics. A substitution rule with physician (patient) veto increases (decreases) generic prices and increases (decreases) the number of generic firms.