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Information Acquisition, Price Informativeness, and Welfare

Rohit RahiJean-Pierre Zigrand

出版	Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=3_nJzQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare. When private signals are noisy, so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices, discouraging information gathering may be Pareto improving. Complementarities in information acquisition can lead to multiple equilibria.