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Modern Appeals to History and Tradition
註釋Many contemporary critics of liberalism have objected to this doctrine's unhistorical understanding of individual autonomy and liberty. In order to assess the merit of these criticisms it would be profitable to return to the early and seminal attempts of Montesquieu and Burke to ground individual liberty in particular histories and traditions. Montesquieu has at various times been labeled a liberal or a conservative, while Burke's reputation is that of a staunch conservative. Yet recently both have been mined for their seemingly capacious notions of liberty. Both of them make careful and nuanced arguments regarding the conditions for liberty, and both have flexible notions of liberty, which include aspects of the ancien regime and of the liberal democratic regimes that eventually followed. Upon careful scrutiny, however, it is difficult to conclude that either of these political thinkers offers a convincing account of embedded liberalism, at once sensitive to historical difference and careful to offer a principled standard for liberty. Montesquieu's purportedly moderate liberalism proves to be no more capacious than that of Hobbes and Locke, while Burke's spirited attempt to salvage respect for tradition coupled with his attack on reason results in unwitting historicism. Efforts to promote moderation and statesmanship on modern liberal grounds are problematic. Montesquieu and Burke agree that political life is for the sake of comfortable self-preservation, and argue that pre-rational affection is crucial for achieving this goal. Our history and traditions help form our sensibilities in such a way as to make possible regulated liberty. Although Montesquieu and Burke offer rich accounts of political life, they both fall short of providing plausible alternatives to the individualistic and universalistic liberalism of Hobbes and Locke. Montesquieu's attempt to account for the irrational historical and social forces that form political character blurs the line between nature and history, and thus makes more difficult the application of a natural standard by which to judge our political affections and commitments. For Burke, nature and history become so confounded as to make impossible standards of liberty or goodness by nature.