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Do Government Controllers Use the Corporate Control Market to Help Improve the Performance of Publicly Listed Chinese SOEs?

Bin Ke

出版	SSRN, 2015
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=5ar6zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We examine whether the corporate control market is an important governance mechanism that the controlling shareholders of publicly listed Chinese SOEs employ to improve the performance of less efficiently run Chinese SOEs. Using an econometric methodology advocated by Maddala (1983), we show that expected future performance improvement is an important consideration in publicly listed Chinese SOEs' control transfer decisions. This result holds for both state-to-private and state-to-state control transfers and the effect is stronger for publicly listed Chinese SOEs domiciled in provinces with stronger institutional environments. There is also preliminary evidence that the firms other than the control transfer target controlled by the acquiring ultimate owners are more efficiently run than the firms controlled by the selling ultimate owners. Overall, our results suggest that the Chinese Government actively uses the corporate control market to help improve the performance of publicly listed Chinese SOEs.