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Moral Skepticism

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

出版	Oxford University Press, USA, 2007-10-19
主題	Philosophy / EpistemologyPhilosophy / Ethics & Moral PhilosophyPhilosophy / Metaphysics
ISBN	01953420629780195342062
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=5pzCOHmcDocC&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBook	SAMPLE

註釋

Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.