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Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweizer's Open Club Model with Semi-Public Goods

Thijs ten RaaRobert Paul Gilles

出版	Center for Economic Research, 2003
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=63FCkgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's concept of club efficiency under a variable number of economic agents. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. We show that given certain conditions, the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.