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An Evaluation of the Impact of Anti-corruption Provisions Within Multilateral Institution Loan Agreements

出版	SSRN, 2019
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=6P_6zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋At the firm level, bribery and corruption can substantially distort international trade by giving unfair advantages to potentially less-competitive firms, allowing bribe recipients to rely on personal enrichment rather than quality to assess the market. At the state level, bribery and corruption can similarly distort the market by skewing the delivery of goods and services to the government in favor of corrupt firms. Anti-bribery laws exist at the state and multilateral level in many instances, but these laws have limited reach and suffer weak enforcement in many countries. Some laws, such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have been applied extraterritorially through evidence of a U.S. nexus. But many firms avoid scrutiny by focusing on domestic transactions, including those with their own government institutions. Two mechanisms have arisen recently to enhance the push for broad acceptance and enforcement of anti-bribery laws. These include trade agreements and multilateral loan agreements. Many trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, include strict anti-bribery provisions applicable to member nations. These often promote fairness in sourcing and procurement and, accordingly, trade and investment. Likewise, loan agreements from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank include rigid anti-corruption policies and investigative and enforcement offices that can debar contractors across a number of multilateral institutions, risking millions in loans to countries in need. Both of these mechanisms apply incentives and disincentives to encourage compliance with principles of fairness and transparency in doing business. Much has been written about anticorruption provisions in trade agreements already. In this paper, I will address the application of anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions in the context of multilateral loan agreements entered into by multilateral development banks (MDBs), specifically focused on those facilitated by the Inter-American Development Bank for Latin American countries. I will explain the applicable policies and enforcement of those provisions and provide an analysis of their effect on levels of trade and corruption in recipient countries.