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Operation Birmingham

Kenneth Sams

出版	HQ PACAF, Directorate, Tactical Evaluation, CHECO Division, 1966
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=7WxcHAAACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

The question that has been raised in this report on "Operation Birmingham" is not new. The honest differences of opinion that exist on the part of the ground commander and the air commander at the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), concerning how much pre-planned air support should be provided, have occurred in past exercises and campaigns. In this operation, stated requirements exceeded the pre-planned sorties provided, except during the last several days of the operation. If Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is to be used as a yardstick for effectiveness, the amount of the tactical air support provided was not justified by the tangible results. If, however, the fact that the 1st Infantry Division was able to move at will through the heart of a Viet Cong-controlled area with relatively few casualties is considered, the close air support provided may have been the deciding factor, regardless of BDA