返回Google圖書搜尋

Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan

出版	New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2010
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=7hc1mgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋"This report by Jonathan Caulkins, Mark Kleiman, and Jonathan Kulick contributes to the ongoing debate about counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, and in relation to counter-insurgency operations by adding a heretofore missing element-applied economic analysis of the effect of counter-narcotics policies. It does so by applying to a stylized depiction of the Afghan situation a standard model that economists and policy analysts have applied to a large range of policy areas. The authors were reluctant to make policy recommendations, as they recognize that their necessarily simplified model of Afghanistan does not take into account fine-grained realities. The overall conclusion--that counter-narcotics policy in the context of a weak state facing violent challengers is likely to aggravate rather than alleviate insurgency, corruption, and criminal violence--opposes much that has been written on the subject. Previous critiques of official counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, including those published by CIC, focused on the counter-productive political and economic effects of the Bush administration's press for poppy eradication and recommended a focus on alternative livelihoods and high-level interdiction. The Obama administration has largely adopted this policy. This report's critique, however, is more radical. At the risk of oversimplification, its main points are: 1. Global production of heroin and opiates will remain concentrated in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future regardless of counter-narcotics efforts, other things being equal, because Afghanistan is by far the lowest cost producer and has invested a great deal of social capital in illicit transnational networks. Unless another potential producer suffers a political crisis making illegality cheaper to sustain, or demand declines, Afghanistan will remain the main producer meeting the global demand. 2. All feasible attempts at suppression or reduction of the opiates industry in Afghanistan under present conditions will result, other things being equal, in increasing the economic size of the industry, and therefore increasing the rents and taxes accruing to insurgents and corrupt officials. This applies equally to crop eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs. Therefore counter-narcotics programming increases rather than decreases both violent insurgency and official corruption. If counter-narcotics policies are effectively targeted at pro-insurgency traffickers, they may be able to reduce insurgency by enabling pro-government traffickers and corrupt officials to enjoy a monopoly. 3. Interdiction and law enforcement strengthen those actors best placed to use illicit power and violence to avoid interdiction and law enforcement, thus leading to concentration of the industry on the one hand and empowerment of insurgents on the other. Again, it may be possible to target counter-narcotics specifically against the insurgency by selective enforcement that effectively tolerates pro-government traffickers and corrupt officials. 4. Alternative livelihood programs targeted at insurgent controlled areas to reduce the resource base of the insurgency contribute directly to funding the insurgency through taxes levied by the insurgents on the alternative livelihood programs."--Page 2.