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Reform and Experimentation After the Cold War, 1989-2001

Philip ShimanElliott Vanveltner ConverseJoseph A. Arena

出版	Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2022
主題	History / Military / GeneralTechnology & Engineering / Military Science
ISBN	01609592769780160959271
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=8j3uzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋"Reform and Experimentation after the Cold War, the 5th volume in the series History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense, focuses on the adoption in the 1990s of new concepts and methods for acquiring major weapon systems. The changes came from several quarters--the White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and Congress--and in response to numerous pressures. The most important of these were the end of the Cold War and the resulting decline in defense spending; advances in weapons technology, especially information technology; and the widespread belief that the acquisition system was failing to deliver the weapon systems the nation needed, when it needed them, and at a cost it was willing to pay. Both President George H. W. Bush and President William J. "Bill" Clinton made correcting acquisition's perceived weaknesses a high priority. Reforms aimed at decreasing the time required to develop and field advanced weapon systems while reducing their cost, strengthening acquisition management and organizations, improving the quality and professionalism of the acquisition workforce, forging new relationships with the defense industry, and tapping the commercial economy for leading-edge technologies, innovative business practices, and finished products easily installed in or adapted to military systems. Despite the many changes of the 1990s, decades-long trends continued: reliance on technologically superior weapons to gain advantage over potential opponents, the centralization of acquisition management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and congressional push for greater oversight. In-depth case studies of major weapon system programs illustrate how acquisition functioned, particularly in adapting to reforms that sometimes succeeded, sometimes failed, and sometimes had no impact on program outcomes. Taken as a whole, however, the reforms made the acquisition community better able to adopt innovations and best practices from the private sector, more responsive to the users of systems, and more capable of designing policies, organizations, and procedures to address the security threats of the new century"--