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Fear, Anger and Failure
William Pfaff
其他書名
A Chronicle of the Bush Administration's War Against Terror from the Attacks in September 2001 to Defeat in Baghdad
出版Algora Publishing, 2004
主題History / Military / United StatesHistory / United States / 21st CenturyPolitical Science / International Relations / GeneralPolitical Science / TerrorismPolitical Science / American Government / General
ISBN08758625519780875862552
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=8n9Eiel3aX8C&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋After September 11, 2001, it was easy to forget the economic uncertainties of the preceding summer, the obvious flaws in the presidential election of 2000 and other brewing problems. But the weaknesses are still with us, and a crack-down on liberties may not be the best answer. Pfaff's columns provide insights into the shifting international dynamics and the reasons why Europeans -- and many Americans -- distrust what appears to be a newly aggressive American imperialism. He also discusses N.A.T.O. and other institutions that we have relied upon to help craft a peaceful and cooperative future. Fear, Anger and Failure is a critical account of the war on terror and the events and forces influencing it or provoked by it, composed of newspaper columns dating from the afternoon of September 11, 2001 and ending in late December, 2003. These articles discuss American policy and personalities, as well as the dramatic change the Bush administration's conduct has produced in Washington's relations with its European allies. The Israeli-Palestinian struggle, crucial to American interests in the Middle East, was necessarily a part of these dynamics. The defeat in Baghdad was implicitly acknowledged by President George W. Bush when he announced on November 14, 2003 that the process by which American Occupation authorities in Iraq would hand power over to Iraqi authorities would be accelerated, with a target date of June 2004. The dream of Mr. Bush and his advisers was that a dramatic democratic transformation of Iraq could be accomplished, provoking quasi-revolutionary political change elsewhere in the Arab-Moslem world, accelerating modernizing forces in Islamic society as a whole. Even before the capture of Saddam Hussein failed to improve the situation, this policy was proven to be what its critics had always said it was: a naïve, sentimental, a-historical and utopian illusion.