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Methodology as Ideology

其他書名	Mathematical Modeling of Trench Warfare
出版	SSRN, 2007
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=9A_izwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋The Evolution of Cooperation, by Axelrod (1984), is a highly influential study that identifies the benefits of cooperative strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. We argue that the most extensive historical analysis in the book, a study of cooperative behavior in First World War trenches, is in error. Contrary to Axelrod's claims, there soldiers in the Western Front were not generally in a prisoner's dilemma (iterated or otherwise), and their cooperative behavior can be explained much more parsimoniously as immediately reducing their risks. We discuss the political implications of this misapplication of game theory.