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Saddam's Generals
Kevin M. Woods
其他書名
Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War
出版Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011
ISBN01608961349780160896132
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=A6k9EFp_ijEC&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋Overview: This monograph represents a continuation of a series of research efforts designed to extend the knowledge of the contemporary Middle East, military history, and Iraqi military effectiveness during the course of three major wars: the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This second volume is based on interviews with figures significant in the Iran-Iraq War, extensive examination and study of captured Iraqi records, and a review of secondary sources. The interviews presented here involve not only lengthy discussions with Lieutenant General Ra'ad Majid Rashid al-Hamdani, staff officer and battalion commander during the Iran-Iraq War, whom the Project 1946 research team had interviewed before, but similar types of discussions with a number of senior Iraqi military leaders who played key parts in the Iran-Iraq War. These were Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi, a senior officer and section leader in Iraq's military intelligence service dealing with Iran during the conflict; Major General (ret) Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas, corps chief of staff, division commander, and director of Iraq's Combat Development Directorate during the war; Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi, commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Navy from 1982 to 1988; and Major General 'Alwan Hassoun 'Alwan al-Abousi, a squadron and wing commander during the conflict. As a result of these interviews, the Project 1946 team deepened and extended its understanding of a number of aspects and incidents during the period. Among the insights gained were: 1) the growth of Iraqi intelligence capabilities during the war's course, 2) the growth of Saddam's perceptions on the nature of war and his broadening understanding of the naval and air wars, 3) the development of Iraqi military doctrine, 4) the lack of a clear strategic or operational vision among Iraq's leaders, military as well as civilian, at the beginning of the war, and 5) the difficulties the Iraqis confronted in incorporating technology and modern conceptions of war into military organizations that did not possess a high level of education"--Page 5-6.