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註釋"Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games and covering supergames. The author then present the first exhaustive study of repeated games with incomplete information (first on one side then on both sides), including the asymptotic approach and the undiscounted maxmin/minmax. Their analysis then proceeds to stochastic games: Shapley operator, algebraic aspect, asymptotic and uniform approaches. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals; stochastic games with lack of information; and non zero-sum games with incomplete information, including communication devices and equilibria. Game theory is extensively used in economics and other social sciences. This book offers a comprehensive treatment of repeated games. Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games, covering supergames, games with incomplete information, and stochastic games. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals and stochastic games with lack of information, and non zero-sum games with incomplete information including communication devices and equilibria"--