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Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure
Florian Hoffmann (Professor in economics)
Roman Inderst
Marco Ottaviani
其他書名
Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation
出版
Centre for Economic Policy Research
, 2022
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=BJvpzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
This paper characterizes equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure based on the personal information that senders acquire about the preferences and orientations of receivers, with applications to strategic marketing and campaigning. We derive positive and normative implications depending on: the extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders collecting personalized data, and whether firms are able to personalize prices. Privacy laws requiring senders to obtain consent to acquire information are beneficial when there is little or asymmetric competition among senders, when receivers are unwary, and when firms caprice discriminate. Otherwise, policy intervention has unintended negative welfare consequences.