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Issue Representation in the 107th-111th Congresses

出版	Stanford University, 2012
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=BtxHAQAACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋In order to assess the quality of our democracy, it is important to understand how often, and in what circumstances, legislators follow the will of their constituents. But scholars still have only a limited understanding about the degree to which legislators follow their constituents' preferences on individual issues. In this dissertation, I develop new techniques to accurately measure the policy preferences of the American public at a variety of geographic levels, including states, congressional districts, and state legislative districts. I use this approach to evaluate the degree to which members of the United States House represent the preferences of their constituents on a wide range of issues. I find that representatives are highly responsive to issue-specific public opinion, but they are more responsive to their partisan sub-constituencies than independents. Next, I examine whether vigorous electoral competition improves the link between legislators and their constituents. I find that legislators are more responsive to their constituents in electorally competitive districts. Moreover, they are less responsive to their partisan sub-constituency. Finally, I examine whether there is a stronger link between legislators and their constituents on the most salient, important issues. I find that greater issue salience does not increase legislators' responsiveness to their average constituent. Instead, representatives are more responsive to their partisan sub-constituency on salient issues. In addition, legislators' roll calls are more likely to be congruent with the opinion of a majority of their partisans on salient issues. Taken together, this dissertation deepens our understanding of representative democracy in the United States.