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Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision
Mr.Thierry TresselMr.Thierry Verdier
出版International Monetary Fund, 2014-05-28
主題Business & Economics / Banks & BankingBusiness & Economics / Labor / GeneralBusiness & Economics / Public Finance
ISBN14983385509781498338554
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=CKwZEAAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles.