註釋 REDD is a multilateral, incentive-based mechanism through which developed states finance avoided deforestation activities in developing states in exchange for tradable carbon emission reduction credits. Developing statesâ responses to REDD range from strong opposition to enthusiastic support, even amongst states with similar incentive structures. This suggests a disjuncture between the logic of incentives and the complex range of domestic factors impacting whether and how states choose to understand and participate in voluntary but centrally coordinated international policy innovations such as REDD. Drawing on insights from policy diffusion, global governance, international pathways and social movements literatures, this work proposes a dynamic analytical framework which sees statesâ adoption and adaptation of REDD as flowing from differences in the nature of the domestic political opportunity structure (POS). This POS explains whether (under what conditions) and how (via what mechanisms or pathways of influence) states come to internationally adopt and domestically adapt voluntary but centrally coordinated international policy innovations. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Bolivia and Peru in 2015, this comparative analysis demonstrates how particular combinations of ideational and institutional POS shaped policy decisions pertaining to REDD at various policy junctures in each case by determining which actors would have access to policy processes, as well as what ideas would be salient therein. It also demonstrates the ways in which REDD policy-making can become embedded in broader webs of domestic power and politics, resulting in domestic adaptations of REDD that are ancillary, and potentially even antithetical, to the mainstream conceptualization of REDD as a market-based mechanism designed to reduce emissions from deforestation. 