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Performance Incentives Under Autocracy

其他書名	Evidence from Russia's Regions
出版	SSRN, 2017
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=CiT9zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Available evidence indicates that there is considerable variation among autocracies in the extent to which subnational officials are rewarded for economic growth. Why is economic performance used as a criterion for appointment in some autocracies but not in others? We argue that in more competitive - though still autocratic - regimes, the political imperatives of maintaining a political machine that can win semi-competitive elections leads regime leaders to abandon cadre policies that promote economic development. Using data on turnover among high-level economic bureaucrats in Russia's 89 regions between 2001 and 2012, we find that performance-based appointments are more frequent in less competitive regions. These findings demonstrate one way that semi-competitive elections can actually undermine economic development under autocracy.