This edition contains a modern afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for Existentialist terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading.

Completed in 1913 as Heidegger’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Freiburg, this work was published in 1914 under the German title "Die lehre vom urteil im psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik " by the academic press of Karl J. Trübner. At the time, Heidegger was a 24-year-old scholar transitioning from Catholic theology to philosophy, studying under Neo-Scholastic thinker Heinrich Rickert. The text emerged amid heated debates in German academia over psychologism—the view that logic derives from empirical psychology—which had been critiqued by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1901). Heidegger’s dissertation reflects Freiburg’s intellectual climate, where Neo-Kantianism, Scholasticism, and early phenomenology intersected. While Husserl had not yet arrived at Freiburg (he would join in 1916), Heidegger’s critique of psychologism aligns with Husserl’s anti-psychologism but is filtered through his training in medieval logic and Aristotelian metaphysics.

The dissertation argues that psychologism’s error lies in conflating the psychological act of judging with the logical structure of judgment itself. Heidegger draws on medieval distinctions like logica docens (theoretical logic) to assert that truth transcends individual minds—a position rooted in his Scholastic influences but hinting at his later focus on Being. Though still framed within traditional metaphysics, the work reveals his early resistance to reducing philosophy to subjective experience, a stance that would evolve into his critique of Cartesian subjectivity in Being and Time (1927). Notably, Heidegger’s later rejection of Scholasticism is foreshadowed here: while he employs medieval categories, he strains against their static formalism, seeking a deeper ground for truth. This text, transitional and methodologically cautious, captures a thinker poised between the theological rigor of his past and the existential-phenomenological turn of his future.

Here Heidegger defends metaphysics. He argues that transcendental logic can't be dismissed by rationalism, as this would destroy its own foundation and paralyze judgment and cognition. This work is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between psychology and logic, focusing on the concept of judgment in the context of psychologism. It begins with a preface acknowledging influences and inspirations, followed by an introduction discussing the impact of psychological research on various fields, including logic. The paper challenges the psychological interpretation of logic and argues for a transcendental-logical view. The main body of the paper is divided into several sections, each examining different aspects and theories related to judgment in the context of psychologism. It includes critical assessments of the theories of notable philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Maier, analyzing their approaches to judgment, its structure, and its various forms. The document explores the nature of judgment, its relation to perception, and the psychological underpinnings of logical thought. Heidegger argues for the need to make a clear distinction between psychological and transcendental methods in logic, arguing for an independent and intrinsic understanding of logic beyond psychological interpretations.