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Sandinista Nicaragua's Resistance to US Coercion
註釋Phase 2: Launching the Signal Flare (1979-1983) -- Phase 3: Amplifying the Signal Flare's Reach (1983-1990) -- CAPSM's Goals and Strategies -- Signal Flare Strategy and Transnational Public Diplomacy -- Drawing U.S. Citizens' Attention -- Direct FSLN Message to U.S. Citizens -- International Organizations: Filing Suit at the World Court -- Hosting Congressional Visits to Nicaragua -- FSLN Leaders Lobby Congress -- International Diplomacy: Contadora and Esquipulas -- Promote Sustained Contentious and Formal Collective Action -- Creating a Counternarrative -- Conclusion -- 5 Media Framing and Opposition to the Use of Force in U.S. Foreign Policy -- Analyzing FSLN and CAPSM's Alternative Framing in Mainstream Media -- Framing Contradictions -- Revolutions Are Not Like Coca-Cola -- Themes -- Contra War Is Illegal -- Contra War Is Immoral -- Contra War Is Futile and Unnecessary -- Contra War Is Counterproductive -- Sandinista Counternarratives -- Narrative 1: United States as the Aggressor -- Narrative 2: Sandinistas Willing to Negotiate and Need for Peaceful Settlement -- Narrative 3: Central America Another Vietnam -- Narrative 4: Reagan Administration Lies to the American People -- Narrative 5: Ordinary U.S. People Telling the Truth -- Contrast with Democratic Opposition -- Media Standing: Prevalence of FSLN and CAPSM's Alternative Frames -- Impact of Framing Contradiction on Public Opinion -- Results of Statistical Tests -- What Do These Findings Mean? -- Conclusion -- Appendix 5.A. Question Wordings -- Appendix 5.B. Coding Sheet -- 6 Activating Public Opinion -- Public Opinion and Social Movements -- Data -- Methods -- Content Analysis: Expected Findings -- Activating Opposition to Reagan's Central American Policy -- International Legitimacy -- Military Solution of the Conflict Rejected -- FSLN's International and Transnational Diplomacy