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Uncertainty in individual and social decisions
註釋In most decisions we have to choose between options that involve some uncertainty about their outcomes and their effect on our well-being. This thesis examines deviations from expected income maximization in situations involving uncertainty. We focus on deviations generated by social factors. The first three chapters of this thesis concern decisions involving ambiguity. It has often been found that people prefer risky options over ambiguous options, even if the ambiguous options are normatively at least as good as the risky options. This phenomenon is called ambiguity aversion. Chapter 2 introduces a new design to test whether a reduction in social evaluation reduces ambiguity aversion. In a situation where the possibility of blame is eliminated no ambiguity aversion is found. Chapter 3 concerns the strength of ambiguity aversion commonly observed in experiments. Chapter 3 presents a prospect theory based model that explains ambiguity aversion in willingness-to-pay by reference dependence and loss aversion. Chapter 4 studies ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auction markets where participants have to select between entering either the market for a risky prospect or the market for an ambiguous prospect. Chapters 5 to 7 deal with decisions under risk. In many empirical studies, participants are given experience and learning opportunities to study thoughtful decisions. In Chapter 5 the opposite approach is used. We let the participants make decisions under time pressure to get some insights into the decision making under risk. Chapter 6 introduces a tractable model that formalizes the idea of process fairness and allows its inclusion into economic theories. Chapter 7 argues that individual fairness preferences can be incorporated in utilitarian social welfare evaluations to remedy the absence of fairness considerations in utilitarianism.