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Reciprocity Game

Linfeng Chen

出版	SSRN, 2019
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=G8P8zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one-period game and the infinitely repeated game.