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出版Standford University, 1984
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=H2Y9YgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋A framework is proposed for analyzing various types of rational interaction. We consider a variety of restrictions on participants' moves; each leads to a different characterization of rational behavior. Under an assumption of common rationality, it is proven that participants will cooperate, rather than defect, in the Prisoner's Dilemma. We will follow the usual convention of representing a game as a payoff matrix. This is a unified framework for considering various types of interactions that occur without communication. Using assumptions about what types of moves other agents will make, a participant is able to reason about what constitutes rational behavior on its own part. Several of the characterizations of rationality have parallels in existing game theory literature, and lead to familiar results such as case analysis and iterated case analysis.