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Career Concerns Incentives: an Experimental Test

Alexander K. KochAlbrecht MorgensternPhilippe Raab

出版	Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus BSS, 2009
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=HxUhzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

Holmstrom's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.