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Uncertain Repeated Games

Ilia KrasikovRohit Lamba

出版	SSRN, 2022
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=I57jzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

Multiple long run players play one amongst multiple possible stage games in each period. They observe and recall past play and are aware of the current stage game being played, but are maximally uncertain about the future evolution of stage games. This setup is termed an uncertain repeated game. The solution concept requires that a subgame perfect equilibrium be played no matter what sequence of stage games realize. The feasible set of payoffs is then so large and complex that it is not obvious how to frame standard results such as the folk theorem, and further how to construct credible rewards and punishments that work irrespective of the future evolution of games. The main goal of the paper is to build such a language and then to construct credible dynamic incentives that work generally for uncertain repeated games. The characterization of equilibrium outcomes is complete for large discount factors and strongly symmetric equilibria, and through an outer bound, shown to be tight for general discounting and asymmetric equilibria.