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Do Donors Discount Low Quality Accounting Information?
註釋Prior research finds that donors reward nonprofits that report larger program ratios with more donations and that managers overstate these ratios, ostensibly to attract donations. We examine how donors react to inflated ratios. We find that the average donor discounts ratios that are inflated by only the simplest and most observable of methods. We then examine the effect of financial data availability on the average donor's ability to unravel inflated ratios by using the historical shift in data availability that occurred in 1997 and 1998. We find that donors began to discount ratios only after 1998. Finally, we examine whether the discount applied to program ratios varies across donor sophistication (measured as the percentage of fund balances with restrictions) and find that sophisticated donors apply incrementally larger discounts to inflated ratios and discount ratios that are inflated by more complex methods.