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註釋In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and theDefense Airborne Reconnaissance Office launched a joint initiative with thegoal to overcome the impediments that had hampered past unmanned aerialvehicle (UAV) development. This effort--designated the High-AltitudeEndurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration(HAE UAV ACTD) program--applied an innovative acquisition strategy to thedevelopment of two UAVs: one conventionally configured (Global Hawk) and theother with a low-observable configuration (DarkStar). The report summarizesthe major research findings regarding the HAE UAV ACTD program's acquisitionstrategy. The authors conclude that despite DarkStar's cancellation--anddespite overall program cost growth and schedule slippage in basic designand test of the two HAE UAV concepts, the ACTD program did accomplish itsprimary objective by successfully demonstrating the military utility of aUAV with a continuous, all-weather, wide-area surveillance capability.Although the program's single requirement--the unit flyaway price--was notmet, it did promote cost consciousness while at the same time preventing theimposition of additional system capabilities during the basic systemdevelopment. The authors found the program's use of Other TransactionAuthority to lend considerable flexibility to the effort. While theprogram's designation as an ACTD imposed cost and schedule boundaries thatconstrained system development, it also provided a high degree offlexibility to adjust the program execution. Areas of risk were addressedas they arose, and early flight test experience was assimilated intocontinuing system development efforts. Relatively modest changes inup-front planning processes, the structured participation of operationalusers early in the program, and contract language regarding oversightprocesses and incentives would ensure successful application of theacquisition strategy to a broader range of systems.