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The Exposure Problem in Static and Dynamic Auctions

Weng Yew Joshua Wong

出版	Singapore Management University, 2010
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=IwaqoAEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We compare, experimentally, the static Vickrey auction and a dynamic ascending-price auction proposed by Ausubel (2004), evaluating their performances in multi-unit environments where items have either complementary or additive values. The problem facing bidders when items demanded are complements is known as the exposure problem, and little is known about bidder behaviour in response to this problem. In the additive environment, we observe significant overbidding in both auctions, and find that revenue is higher in the Ausubel auction while efficiency is similar in both auctions. In the complementary environment, we find that revenue is similar in both auctions but efficiency is higher in the Ausubel auction. The results suggest that the exposure problem is more serious in the Vickrey auction, while the Ausubel auction is robust to complementarities.