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The Existence Puzzles

其他書名	An Introduction to Population Ethics
出版	Oxford University Press, 2023-10
主題	Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy
ISBN	01975441699780197544167
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=JkYo0AEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋"This book introduces newcomers to population ethics, the inquiry into how changes in how many people, and just who, will exist bear on moral law. It also proposes a new way of thinking about the hard cases and questions population ethics is so widely known for. An intuitive first pass at what moral law has to say about choices to bring additional people into existence comes from Narveson. We are "in favour of making people happy." Or so says what this book calls the basic maximizing intuition. But we are "neutral about making happy people." Or so says what this book calls the basic existential intuition (itself a distant and more credible cousin of the person affecting intuition). Ever since questions relating to population variability gained attention in the late 1960s or so, the dominant narrative among population ethicists, including Parfit, has been that Narveson unwittingly contradicted himself-and that as between the two intuitions it's the basic existential intuition that must go. We must, the argument has been accede to a traditional total form of maximizing consequentialism. Leaving us with a (somewhat terrifying) obligation to procreate. Tying our hands in addressing climate change, disapproving of the constitutional rights of contraception and early abortion and giving credence instead to Dobbs v. Jackson and demanding grave sacrifices from vast numbers of people who do or will exist in exchange for the tiniest chance that the human species can multiply indefinitely over the very, very long term. It's a poor story. This book proposes a better story. Hard population cases generate not counterexamples disproving the basic existential intuition but rather a series of puzzles it's our job to solve under the governance of the puzzle-solving rules we all know well: we fit the pieces together without throwing any of them out and within the formal requirements of consistency, cogency and the conceptual principles we seem to have no choice but to accept. Reconciliation, and not refutation, is thus the aim, with each chapter concluding with principles-together, person based consequentialism-that allow us to retain, not the basic maximizing intuition in a careless or unfettered form, but rather in a form that is constrained in very precise ways by the basic existential intuition"--