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註釋"day. The moralists of the later Renaissance, or Catholic Reaction, felt it necessary to defend every social practice on the ground of its real or imaginary relation to virtue, as the only thing which can ever justify anything to a moralist. So the sixteenth century theorists of "honour" called honour a form of virtue; those who argued about the nature of true nobility made it to consist of virtue (a theory, indeed, as old as Menander and Juvenal); just as the moralists of the Middle Ages had justified "love" by calling it a virtue, too. For Della Casa, however, the real foundation of good manners is to be found in the desire to please. This desire is the aim or end of all manners, teaching us alike to follow what pleases others and to avoid what displeases them. This is a far cry from virtue, which in its very essence would seem to be divorced from the idea of conciliating the moods or whims of those about us; unless we assume that perhaps the slight personal sacrifice involved in yielding to such whims was the only form of virtue which a fashionable prelate might care to recognize. In order to give pleasure, we are told, it is essential to pay heed to the way a thing is done [...]."