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Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution

出版	School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, Univ., 2014
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=K6IKrgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic family model with human capital. We show how a government can improve the trade-off between equality and incentives by changing the amount of observable human capital. We provide an intuitive decomposition for the wedge between human-capital investment in the laissez faire and the social optimum. This wedge differs from the wedge for bequests because human capital carries risk: its returns depend on the non-diversifiable risk of children's ability. Thus, human capital investment is encouraged more than bequests in the social optimum if human capital is a bad hedge for consumption risk.