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Strategic Candidates and Strategic Voters

其他書名	Lessons from the US, the UK, and Chile
出版	University of California, Davis, 2020
ISBN	9798672184814
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=LhRAzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋In this dissertation I seek to provide novel empirical tests for classic theories about the relationship between electoral systems, party systems, and the behavior of voters and elites. Specifically, each chapter of this dissertation tests a proposition by Gary Cox about an effect of electoral systems that is currently contested in the comparative politics literature. I do so with country cases uniquely suited for testing these theories, with new data, and with sophisticated methodological approaches. In short, this dissertation does not focus on a single research question or country, but instead seeks to provide key evidence in decades-long unresolved debates on Cox's theories on the effects of electoral systems. In Chapter 2, I examine the effect of electoral systems used in US state legislative elections on candidate ideological dispersion. Cox (1990) suggests that, under certain conditions, greater district magnitude has a centrifugal polarizing effect on candidate ideology. However, recent cross‐national investigations of this theory have produced conflicting results. In order to bring new evidence to bear on this ongoing debate and overcome some of the limitations of previous studies, I conduct a novel analysis of the relationship between electoral system and candidate polarization in a sub-national context. I find strong evidence for a polarizing relationship between district magnitude and candidate ideology. Even though plurality (not proportional) voting rules are used for multiseat districts in US state legislative elections, increased district magnitude is still associated with increased candidate ideological dispersion. In other words, despite providing no increase in proportional representation, plurality-rule multiseat districts in US state legislative elections increase candidate polarization. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to the theory that majoritarian electoral systems induce strategic voting. Specifically, I examine Liberal Democrat voters in the 2015 UK general election, who are a "most-likely'' case for strategic voting. Public opinion sharply turned against their party since the previous election in 2010 and the party was widely expected to do poorly in 2015. I find evidence that Liberal Democrat voters voted strategically for Labour and Conservative candidates in order to maximize their odds of affecting the electoral outcome in their constituency. I find that Liberal Democrat voters who expected a close election and who believed their own party's candidate stood no chance of victory were by far the most likely to defect and make a strategic vote. This case study provides empirical evidence for the theory that voters are psychologically averse to vote wasting. Chapter 4 approaches the study of strategic voting from a different angle. Unlike Chapter 3, which examines strategic voting in a majoritarian electoral system, in Chapter 4 I focus on the determinants of strategic voting under a proportional electoral system. In addition, rather than contribute another case study of a single election, I seek to leverage Chile's 2015 electoral reform, which increased the district magnitude of districts in Chile's lower legislative chamber from two to between three and eight. This increase in district magnitude (in combination with Chile's proportional seat allocation formula) should decrease the incentives for strategic voting. Unlike with the UK case in Chapter 3, Chile's reform allows for a convenient "natural experiment.'' If they behave in line with theoretical expectations, post-reform voters should strategically vote at lower levels than pre-reform voters. Furthermore, given the variation in district magnitude post-reform, we should expect disparities in the prevalence of strategic voting in post-reform districts, with voters in higher magnitude, more proportional, districts strategically voting at lower rates. I find strong evidence that voters have responded to Chile's electoral reform by engaging in less party-level strategic voting. However, I surprisingly find no evidence that the reform has decreased strategic voting for Chile's pre-electoral pacts (perhaps because the electorate is still adjusting to electoral reform). This study demonstrates that Chile's electoral reform is already affecting voter behavior and is doing so in line with theoretical expectations.