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Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants
Clare Leaver
Owen Ozier
Pieter Serneels
Andrew Zeitlin
其他書名
Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
出版
World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group
, 2020
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=MMIgzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.