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The Corporate Network of Interlocking Directorates, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance in China's Transitional Economy
註釋The other is to act as a social cohesion device to exploit institutional voids, facilitate managerial class exploitation, and dampen firm performance when governance fails. Fourth, ownership structure is an important factor in moderating directorship interlock network effects on firm performance during the institutional transition. Cross-sectional data from 949 listed firms in 1999 and panel data from 284 listed firms spanning eight years (1994-2001) were employed to examine the interlock network structure and test the propositions. The results show that, first, directorship interlock network reflects the key structural features of Chinese economy. Second, the formation of interlocks reflects the inter-organizational demand and the demand of external interest group coalitions. Third, due to governance failure and institutional voids, interlock network acts as a social cohesion device and enables the emerging managerial class to exploit modern corporations to the detriment of shareholders' interests. This exploitation has dampened firm performance and economic growth. Such exploitation is constrained under concentrated ownership structure and under the ownership structure with high level of state ownership. The dissertation contributes to the current literature in the following ways. First, it reports the first examination of the structural aspect of Chinese economy. Second, borrowing the conventional wisdom in directorship interlock literature, the dissertation incorporates China's unique institutional environments in examining the antecedents and consequences of directorship interlock, transcending the narrow theoretical synthesis of current interlock studies.