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Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium

Tito CordellaManjira Datta

出版	SSRN, 1997
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=N3HgzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).