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God, Conceivability, and Evil
註釋

Perhaps you’ve heard that Alvin Plantinga resolved the logical problem of evil decades ago and that even most atheists agree. But, what if you aren’t most folks? What if you find yourself in that minority of folks who still worry about the compatibility of God and evil? What if you question Plantinga’s dubious suggestion that God’s desire for moral good is a good enough reason for Him to allow evil (if, as it turned out, He couldn’t get any moral good without allowing at least some evil)? What is the resolve for worries such as these? God, Conceivability, and Evil is about resolving the logical problem of evil for the rest of us. And, importantly, it is about doing so in a way that allows us to avoid BS-ing ourselves and others in the process. The solution that Moore defends to the logical problem of evil, in view of his worries about Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, is philosophically interesting, methodologically intuitive, theologically consistent and apologetically pertinent.