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Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?
Daniel McDowell
其他書名
The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort
出版
Oxford University Press
, 2017
主題
Business & Economics / Economic History
Business & Economics / International / General
Business & Economics / Money & Monetary Policy
Political Science / International Relations / General
Political Science / International Relations / Trade & Tariffs
Political Science / Public Policy / Economic Policy
Political Science / Geopolitics
ISBN
0190605766
9780190605766
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=OAs1DQAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBook
SAMPLE
註釋
Machine generated contents note: -- Table of Contents -- Table of Figures -- Table of Tables -- Preface -- List of Abbreviations -- CHAPTER 1 - Introduction -- 1. THE PUZZLE -- 2. THE ARGUMENT -- 3. PLAN OF THE BOOK and FINDINGS -- CHAPTER 2 - The ILLR in Theory and Practice -- 1. AN INTERNATIONAL LLR: A BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONCEPT -- 1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon -- 1.2 The ILLR and the IMF -- 2. THE IMF'S LIMITATIONS AS ILLR -- 2.1. The Problem of Unresponsiveness -- 2.2. The Problem of Resource Insufficiency -- 3. THE UNITED STATES' ILLR MECHANISMS -- 3.1. The Mechanics of Currency Swaps -- 3.2. Speed and Independence -- 3.3. Lending Capacity -- 3.4. Division of Labor -- 4. CONCLUSIONS -- CHAPTER 3 - The United States Invents its Own ILLR, 1961-1962 -- 1. MORE DOLLARS, MORE PROBLEMS -- 1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut -- 1.2. Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation -- 2. IN SEARCH OF AN ILLR -- 2.1. The General Arrangements to Borrow -- 3. AN ALTERNATIVE ILLR: CENTRAL BANK CURRENCY SWAPS -- 3.1. The Fed's Novel Idea -- 3.2. Who Needs the IMF? -- 3.3. How the Swap Lines Protected U.S. Interests -- 3.4. Why did Europe Cooperate? -- 4. CONCLUSIONS -- CHAPTER 4 - The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s -- 1. THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND -- 2. 1980s: GLOBAL BANKING AND THE DEBT CRISIS -- 2.1. The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness -- 2.2. The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness -- 3. 1990s: PORTFOLIO FLOWS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES -- 3.1. Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency -- 3.2. The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency -- 4. CONCLUSIONS -- CHAPTER 5 - Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bailout, 1983-1999 -- 1. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND ESF BAILOUT SELECTION -- 2. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ESF BAILOUT SELECTION -- 3. RESULTS -- 4. CONCLUSIONS -- CHAPTER 6 - U.S. International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s -- 1. CASE SELECTION -- 2. THE CASES -- 2.1. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 1982-1983 -- 2.2. Argentina, 1984 -- 2.3. Poland, 1989 -- 2.4. Mexico, 1995 -- 2.5. Thailand, 1997 -- 2.6. Indonesia and South Korea, 1997 -- 2.7. Declining Use: The ESF is Put Out to Pasture -- 3. CONCLUSIONS -- CHAPTER 7 - The United States as ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008-2009 -- 1. BACKGROUND: "A NOVEL ASPECT" OF THE GREAT PANIC OF 2008 -- 2. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS -- 3. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FED SWAP LINE SELECTION -- 4. THE INTEREST RATE THREAT AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS -- 5. TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF FOMC MEETINGS -- 5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007 - December 2007 -- 5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008 - August 2008 -- 5.3. Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008 - October 28, 2008 -- 5.4. Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008 -- 6. CONCLUSIONS -- CHAPTER 8 - Conclusions -- 1. CONTRIBUTIONS -- 2. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AS ILLR -- 3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS -- 4. FINAL THOUGHTS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- APPENDIX