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Can There be a Market for Cheap-talk Information?
Antonio Cabrales
Francesco Feri
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
Piero Gottardi
其他書名
Some Experimental Evidence
出版
Centre for Economic Policy Research
, 2016
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=OVYJkAEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that these markets are fragile. The reasons are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. We show that this is not because subjects play a different (babbling) equilibrium. By analyzing subjects' behavior in another game, we find that those adopting deceptive strategies tend to have envious or non-pro-social traits. The poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets.
