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A Bargaining Perspective on Vertical Integration
Hendrik Döpper
Geza Sapi
Christian Wey
出版
Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
, 2022
ISBN
386304388X
9783863043889
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=Owg_zwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
This paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where input market outcomes are determined by bargaining. Vertical integration incentives are a combination of horizontal integration incentives up- and downstream and depend on the strength of substitutability or complementarity and the shape of the unit cost function. In contrast to the widely prevailing view in competition policy, vertical integration can under particular circumstances convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. In a bidding game for an exogenously determined target firm, a vertical merger can dominate a horizontal one, while pre-emption does not occur.
