登入選單

返回Google圖書搜尋

Factivity-violating Knowledge

Adam Michael Bricker

出版	Aberdeen University, 2015
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=RJpAyQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

At the centre of this project is the property of factivity, a property which obtains for a propositional attitude if and only if it is necessarily held to and only to truths. It has long been assumed that knowledge is one such factive propositional attitude. Namely, one has knowledge that p only if p. The primary purpose of my project is to introduce a major challenge to the claim that knowledge is factive, a challenge which comes by the way of something I have dubbed "factivity-violating knowledge." Factivity-violating knowledge (FVK) is the subset of the phenomenon of knowledge which is incompatible with a principle of factivity. A large portion of this project is dedicated to the detailed description of FVK and the documentation of the non-factivity of the phenomenon of knowledge. In the course describing FVK, it becomes evident that it is highly problematic to retain factivity for a concept of knowledge. In short, my primary claim is this: It is quite mistaken to assume that knowledge is factive.