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Freedom and Belief

Galen Strawson

出版	OUP Oxford, 1986
主題	Language Arts & Disciplines / Linguistics / GeneralPhilosophy / GeneralPhilosophy / EpistemologyPhilosophy / Ethics & Moral PhilosophyPhilosophy / Free Will & DeterminismPhilosophy / MetaphysicsPhilosophy / Mind & BodyPsychology / General
ISBN	01992474989780199247493
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=RTkqAQAAMAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.