登入選單

返回Google圖書搜尋

Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life

Sylvia Berryman

出版	Oxford University Press, 2019
ISBN	01918765699780191876561
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=Ra7ZxQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This work challenges the common belief that Aristotle's virtue ethics is founded on an appeal to human nature, an appeal that is thought to be intended to provide both substantive ethical advice and justification for the demands of ethics. It is argued that it is not Aristotle's intent, but the view is resisted that Aristotle was blind to questions of the source or justification of his ethical views. Aristotle's views are interpreted as a 'middle way' between the metaphysical grounding offered by Platonists and the scepticism or subjectivist alternatives articulated by others. The commitments implicit in the nature of action figure prominently in this account: Aristotle reinterprets Socrates' famous paradox that no one does evil willingly, taking it to mean that a commitment to pursuing the good is implicit in the very nature of action. This approach is compared to constructivism in contemporary ethics. -- Provided by publisher